




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# Rome and its Allies in Asia Minor: A Study on Political Relationship between Rome, Rhodes, and Pergamon from the Peace of Apamea to the End of Third Macedonian War

Dapeng Chen

## ABSTRACT

The Battle of Magnesia (190 BC) ended with the victory of the Romans and their allies, and the distribution of former Seleucid territories west of the Taurus Mountains to Rhodes and Pergamon, who contributed crucially to Rome's victory. Although the Romans *de facto* held the sole supremacy of the Mediterranean, Rhodes and Pergamon acted as independent states. Their relationship did not always go smoothly, whilst Rome's dissatisfaction and enmity towards Rhodes and Pergamon grew steadily.

The paper will analyse substantial events and turning points in the relationship between Rome and its primary allies in the Eastern Mediterranean from the Peace of Apamea (188 BC) to the aftermath of the Third Macedonian War (171-168 BC): the disputes between Rhodes and Lycia with Roman interventions and Roman hostilities to Rhodes and Pergamon after the Third Macedonian War. By examining surviving literary accounts and comparative studies of the Rhodo-Lycian and Pergamene-Galatian conflicts, this paper suggests a Roman strategy to allies with whom they were dissatisfied. The Romans could sink their allies' strength by granting autonomy to revolting areas whose armed rebellions had been suppressed by the allies recently and by encouraging them to revolt again.

## INTRODUCTION

After the Roman victory over the Seleucid King Antiochus III at Magnesia, the Romans did not seek to establish direct control over Asia Minor. Instead, they distributed former Seleucid territories west of the Taurus Mountains to their allies Rhodes and Pergamon, who became the successors of Seleucid influence in Western Asia Minor.

Although King Eumenes II of Pergamon sometimes publicly acknowledged Roman support behind the rise of his realm, he acted in many ways as an independent ruler and "common benefactor" [κοινὸς εὐεργέτης] of the Greeks, a title which was

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also granted to the Romans.<sup>1</sup> The king declared wars as he saw fit, conducted diplomacy as he wished, and even used the Roman legions to expand his realm.<sup>2</sup> The Rhodians were more concerned with their trading interests and tried to stay out of conflicts unless their independence was threatened.<sup>3</sup>

Rhodes and Pergamon were not henchmen of Rome but equal *amici et socii*.<sup>4</sup> However, their friendship with Rome was not constant. Their relationship deteriorated after a decade, and during the Third Macedonian War (171-168 BC), they finally lost Roman favour. The Rhodians tried to stay neutral and to mediate between the Romans and King Perseus of Macedonia, which incurred Rome's wrath. Rhodian power collapsed as a result.<sup>5</sup> Furthermore, the Romans were furious with Eumenes because of a rumour that Eumenes had made a secret treaty with Perseus.<sup>6</sup> The Senate plotted to replace him with his brother Attalus and demanded that he leave Italy immediately when he wished to revisit Rome.<sup>7</sup>

Was the change in Roman attitude the result of a series of acts by the Rhodians and Pergamenes after the Peace of Apamea? Or was it due to their disloyalty and misconduct during the Third Macedonian War? These are not simple questions. This article will analyse the Rhodo-Lycian conflict, the conflict between the Attalids and the Galatians, and the Roman intervention to examine Roman strategy in western Asia Minor from the Peace of Apamea until the end of the Third Macedonian War.

#### *REVIEW OF EVENTS AND HISTORIOGRAPHY*

In 189 BC, the Senate granted Caria and Lycia to the Rhodians in return for their contribution to the previous war against Antiochus. According to Polybius, the ten commissioners sent by the Senate tried to satisfy both the Rhodians and the Illyrians, who pleaded the commissioners not to punish their kinsman Lycians severely, and gave them ambiguous replies; the Lycians revolted against the Rhodians because of that divergence. In 178 BC, the defeated Lycians dispatched a mission to Rome, and the Senate responded by declaring that Lycia was given as a friend and ally [ὡς φίλοι καὶ σύμμαχοι] rather than a gift [ἐν δωρεῇ] to Rhodes. Eventually, Rhodes was deprived of Caria and Lycia by the Romans

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<sup>1</sup> SEG 47.1745; OGIS 763 = RC 52; Syll<sup>3</sup> 630; Thonemann 2013, 37-38.

<sup>2</sup> Livy 38.12-28; Zimmermann 2011, 36.

<sup>3</sup> Berthold 1987, 167-178; Ager 1991, 26-29.

<sup>4</sup> Matthaëi 1907, 184-187; Gruen 1984, 55-69.

<sup>5</sup> Magie 1950, 110; Ager 1991, 29-37.

<sup>6</sup> Polybius 29.5-9.

<sup>7</sup> Polybius 30.1.4-8.

after the Third Macedonian War.<sup>8</sup>

There has been a considerable scholarly debate about the Rhodo-Lycian dispute in the second half of the last century, although much less recently. The majority consider that Lycia was initially given to Rhodes as a gift; however, there is a dispute on the Roman reply to the Rhodians and Lycians: some scholars believe that the involved parties misunderstood the commissioners' response.<sup>9</sup> Others argue that Roman commissioners consciously gave an ambiguous answer, and the Senate's decision in 178 BC was a deliberate attempt to weaken Rhodian power.<sup>10</sup> A few scholars admit the ambiguity of the response but are reserved towards the commissioners' intention.<sup>11</sup>

Unlike most scholars, H. Schmitt, E. Gruen, V. Gabrielsen and R. Behrwald question the credibility of the account by the contemporary Greek historian Polybius. Schmitt and Gruen point out that Polybius 22.5 and 25.4 used Rhodian sources, providing an interpretation in favour of the Rhodians.<sup>12</sup> Gruen further argues that Rome and Rhodes remained friendly until the end of the Third Macedonian War. Gabrielsen considers there was no reason for the Rhodians to send other embassies, and the account was added later. Following Schmitt, Behrwald questions the credibility of Polybius and advocates that there was no indication of the collaboration between the Rhodians and the Seleucids and consequential Roman hostility.<sup>13</sup>

In 168 BC, the Galatians revolted against Eumenes when his position was weakened because of Roman dissatisfaction towards him; the Galatians were defeated in 166/5 BC and despatched a mission to Rome. In response, the Senate granted the Galatians autonomy.<sup>14</sup>

The Pergamene-Galatian struggle is less controversial than the Rhodo-Lycian event. F. W. Walbank, the author of the still seminal commentary on Polybius, argues that Polybius' account implies that the Romans had no intention of ending the conflict because of their dissatisfaction with Eumenes.<sup>15</sup> Walbank's interpretation coincides with that of many scholars.<sup>16</sup> Gruen disagreed and held

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8 Polybius 21.18-24, 22.5, 25.4, 30.31; Livy 37.52-56, 41.6.8-2.

9 van Gelder 1900, 142-143; Berthold 1987, 170; Eckstein 1988, 414-444; Bresson 1998, 74-77; Wiemer 2003, 277-288.

10 Fraser/Bean 1954, 107-117; Larsen 1968, 245-247; Errington 1972, 193-194; Bresson 1999, 106-118; Dmitriev 2011, 311.

11 Ager 1997, 277; Errington 2008, 233.

12 Schmitt 1957, 97-98; Gruen 1975, 58-81.

13 Gruen 1975, 58-81; Gruen 1984, 123; Gabrielsen 1997, 47-53; Behrwald 2000, 84-88.

14 Polybius 29.22.3-4, 30.28; Rankin 1996, 198-199; it is difficult to tell the exact time of Eumenes' victory over the Galatians; see Walbank 1979, 454.

15 Walbank 1979, 419.

16 Magie 1950, 23; McShane 1959, 183; Hansen 1971, 122; Hopp 1977, 52; Allen 1983, 142; Rankin 1996, 198; Dmitriev 1999, 410-411; Zimmermann 2011, 36-38.

that the Senate declaring Galatia as autonomous was aimed at restricting the Galatians.<sup>17</sup>

### *SOURCES AND METHODOLOGIES*

Historians specialising in Hellenistic Rhodes or Pergamon have often limited themselves to Roman-Rhodian or Roman-Pergamene aspects and rarely synthesise them, even though they may reveal a coherent pattern of Roman behaviour. Through a comparative study, this paper attempts to analyse how the Romans treated their allies and how they reacted to the existing Hellenistic institution of diplomacy.

Literary sources are primary to this research, providing vital information on the political relationship between Rome, Rhodes and Pergamon. Polybius' work, though fragmentary, documents major diplomatic activities of this period. However, his Achaean origins, his personal ties with Roman patrons, and his political views make his narratives impossible to be unbiased. To use Polybius' texts requires meticulous source criticism.

Books 35 to 45 of Livy are also essential. Livy used Polybius' work as his source in many cases but cited several texts from Annalist or other Roman sources as well, which preserved narratives from the views of the Romans, particularly concerning Roman-Pergamene and Roman-Rhodian relations during the Third Macedonian War. Diodorus Siculus, Appian of Alexandria, and Justin's epitome also offer valuable fragments.

### **THE RHODO-LYCIAN DISPUTE**

Almost all current debates about the Rhodian-Lycian dispute revolve around the request of the envoys from Ilium and the response of the ten commissioners in Polybius 22.5. Most previous studies accept Polybius' explanation with but a few questions.<sup>18</sup> This paper argues that Polybius' accounts of the cause of the Lycian revolt and the Lycian embassy in 178 BC were shaped by Rhodian sources and a cover-up. Therefore, there were no Rhodian and Ilian envoys with contradicting requests and no responses by the ten commissioners, at least concerning Lycia.

### *THE TEN COMMISSIONERS*

Because of the importance of Polybius 22.5, further discussion requires a re-examination of the passage:

“At the time when the ten commissioners were administering the affairs of Asia, two envoys, Theaetetus

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<sup>17</sup> Gruen 1984, 577-578; cf. Polybius 30.28.2.

<sup>18</sup> See notes 9, 10 and 11.

and Philophron, arrived from Rhodes asking that Lycia and Caria should be given to the Rhodians in return for their goodwill and active assistance in the War with Antiochus; and at the same time two envoys from the people of Ilium, Hipparchus, and Satyrus, came begging that, for the sake of the kinship between Ilium and Rome, the offenses of the Lycians might be pardoned. The ten commissioners, after giving both embassies a hearing, attempted as far as possible to meet the requests of both. For to please the people of Ilium they took no very severe measures against the Lycians; but, as a favor to the Rhodians, they assigned Lycia to them as a gift. Owing to this decision a quarrel of no trivial character arose between the Lycians and the Rhodians, themselves. For the representatives of Ilium, visiting the Lycian cities, announced that they had softened the anger of the Romans and had been instrumental in obtaining their freedom. Theaetetus, however, and his colleague published in Rhodes the message that Lycia and Caria, south of the Meander, had been given to Rhodes as a present by the Romans."<sup>19</sup>

The first point of doubt is that the Polybian account is the only one. Livy and Diodorus' fragments make no mention of this. Polybius 21.46 mentions a territorial dispute between Eumenes' and Antiochus' emissaries over the ownership of Pamphylia, which was eventually referred to the Senate, whilst they did not do so in the case of Lycia.<sup>20</sup> Moreover, according to Livy, the missing part in Polybius 21.46 mentions that Rhoeteum and Gergitha were given to Ilium as a gift because of Ilium's kinship with Rome, but not the Ilians' request or the ten commissioners' response.<sup>21</sup>

Secondly, the account itself is problematic: before the Ilian emissaries, Polybius described two Rhodian emissaries and their demands, but there seems to be no reason for the Rhodians to send emissaries to claim [ἀξιοῦντες] Lycia and Caria since the Senate had already explicitly decided, in the summer of 189 BC at the negotiations in Rome, that Lycia and Caria south of the Meander should be given to Rhodes.<sup>22</sup> The ten commissioners' task was only to deal with the details of the Senatorial decision, and this decision was included in the Senate's reply to all the

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<sup>19</sup> Polybius 22.5.1-8. All English translations in this paper are cited from the Loeb edition.

<sup>20</sup> Polybius 21.46.10-11.

<sup>21</sup> Livy 38.39.10.

<sup>22</sup> Polybius 21.24.6-10.

delegates in Rome.<sup>23</sup> Polybius and Livy record this clearly: Caria and Lycia were given directly to Rhodes, which is in line with the Roman arrangement of Asia Minor west of the Taurus Mountains.<sup>24</sup>

The ten commissioners arrived in Asia Minor in the summer of 188 BC and waited until Antiochus III ratified the treaty.<sup>25</sup> The Rhodians had more than one year to learn of this, and there was no reason to claim this land, which had been a *fait accompli*.<sup>26</sup> Moreover, since the grant of Caria and Lycia was decided by the Senate, it seemed unreasonable for the ten commissioners not to submit a request that contradicted the Senate's previous decision to the Senate but tried to accommodate both parties "as far as possible". Whether intentional or not, Polybius' usage of the word "negotiate" [ἔχρημάτισαν] is rather misleading, as if Lycia and Caria had been given to Rhodes by negotiation with ten commissioners. Livy's expression here is entirely different:

"The people of Rhodes were given confirmation of what they had been granted by the earlier decree: they were accorded Lycia and Caria as far as the River Maeander, with the exception of Telmessus."<sup>27</sup>

Besides, the first revolt of Lycia did not, as Polybius implies, take place immediately after the rejection of the alliance in 188 BC.<sup>28</sup> Zimmermann and Bresson believe it took place after 180 BC, whilst Wiemer argues for 185 or 184 BC.<sup>29</sup> The Lycian embassy set out from the outskirts of the revolt and arrived in Rome after Lycia had been completely subdued by the Rhodians.<sup>30</sup> It seems impossible that the embassy was delayed on the way for about ten years.

Gabrielsen rightly points out the dubiousness of the causes of the Rhodian-Lycian dispute in Polybius 22.5.<sup>31</sup> This account is not at the end of Book 21, the central account of the settlement of Asia Minor by ten commissioners but was added later. It is possibly a narrative invented to conceal the real cause of the revolt in Lycia in favour of the Rhodians.<sup>32</sup>

Taking together the other accounts of Polybius, Livy, Diodorus

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23 Livy 37.55.4-6.

24 Polybius 21.24.7-8; Livy 37.55.5.

25 Polybius 21.42.6; Livy 38.39.5-6.

26 Gabrielsen 1997, 47-50.

27 Livy 38.39.13-15.

28 Polybius 22.5.10.

29 Zimmermann 1993, 115; Bresson 1999, 107-109; Wiemer 2003, 266-267.

30 Polybius 25.2-3.

31 Gabrielsen 1997, 47-53.

32 Schmitt 1957, 97; Gruen 1975, 58-81; Walbank 1979, 181.

and Pompeius Trogus, it is not difficult to conclude that Lycia and Caria were explicitly given to Rhodes by the Senate as a reward.<sup>33</sup> The entire Eastern Mediterranean knew about this decision.<sup>34</sup> The revolt may have had other reasons: Lycia had a privileged position in the Eastern Mediterranean trade and was rich in timber for shipbuilding.<sup>35</sup> The Rhodians had coveted this rich land for a long time.<sup>36</sup> The Lycian embassy in 178 BC stated that Rhodian oppression was even more brutal than that of Antiochus. In a speech of the Rhodian delegate Astymedes to the Senate in 164 BC, he mentioned that Lycia and Caria brought Rhodes enormous revenues.<sup>37</sup> However, it is also possible that these speeches were exaggerated for rhetorical or political purposes.<sup>38</sup> The details of Rhodian rule are hardly known, but it is not a sensible explanation to attribute the cause of the Rhodo-Lycian dispute to two emissaries from Ilium.

### *THE ROMAN INTERVENTION*

The ten commissioners' reply is also referred to in Polybius's account of the Lycian embassy to Rome in 178 BC, but there is no trace in Livy's account.<sup>39</sup> This mission may have been just one moment within a larger shift in Roman attitudes towards Rhodes after the Treaty of Apamea. The Romans may or may not have been irritated with the Rhodians because of the Rhodian escort of Perseus' bride Laodice in exchange for shipbuilding timber.<sup>40</sup> Still, the dissatisfaction of Rome was explicit: the Rhodians sent an emissary to Rome immediately after receiving the Senate's decision.<sup>41</sup> However, the Senate's reply was deferred, according to Polybius, contrasting sharply with the swift and straightforward response to the Lycian mission, which A. Eckstein overlooks.<sup>42</sup>

It is probably less likely that the Romans were outraged simply by a mediation attempt of Rhodes in 168 BC: King Prusias II of Bithynia, who also mediated between Romans and Macedonians, was rewarded by the Senate instead of being punished.<sup>43</sup> The act of mediation did not constitute an offence to Rome, and it

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33 Polybius 21.24, 46; Livy 37.55.4-7, 56.1-6; 38.39.13-15; Diodorus 29.11; Appian, *Syriaca* 44; Justin, *Epitome* 31.8.9.

34 Livy 37.55.4-6.

35 Bresson 1999, 111-113.

36 Bresson 1999, 107.

37 Berthold 1987, 204-205.

38 Livy 41.6.9; Bresson 1999, 111-113.

39 The year when the Lycian mission arrived in Rome is disputed. According to Walbank, the reception may have taken place in the summer of 178 BC. See Walbank 1979, 277-278.

40 Polybius 25.4.8; Appian, *Macdonica* 11.2; Schmitt 1957, 97-98; Behrwald 2000, 86.

41 Polybius 25.4.6-10; cf. Behrwald 2000, 85.

42 Polybius 25.5.4-5; Eckstein 2008, 355.

43 Polybius 29.19.5; Berthold 1987, 204-205; Eckstein 1988, 426-434.

continued to occupy an important place in Roman foreign affairs after the Third Macedonian War.<sup>44</sup> Nor was neutrality in war offensive to the Romans: Roman *amicitia* was not an alliance of mutual defence, and Rhodes did not remain completely neutral; they sent a fleet to assist the Romans, but this fleet was refused. Moreover, staying neutral did not lead to wars: Ariarathes IV, king of Cappadocia, who fought alongside Antiochus III in the Roman-Syrian War, only had to pay a mere 600 talents of silver in reparations.<sup>45</sup>

P. J. Burton argues that Roman diplomacy was based on moral norms, *fides* and *amicitia*. There was no actual Roman enmity towards their friends during this period.<sup>46</sup> He claims that the Romans punished the Rhodians because they said their original intention was to negotiate peace when congratulating the Senate after Perseus was defeated, which was arrogant and proud. Therefore, the Roman punishment was "hard but fair."<sup>47</sup>

In Livy's work, there are accounts of Rhodians being arrogant. One example is a haughty speech from the Rhodian peace-negotiating mission in 169 BC based on annalist sources, in which the envoy declaimed that the Rhodians would take against the Romans if they declined the peace offer. Livy commented that "even now, these statements cannot be read or heard without indignation."<sup>48</sup> The Senate returned no answer but immediately despatched legates to declare Caria and Lycia free.

This speech and the Senatorial response to it are considered an annalistic fabrication.<sup>49</sup> Polybius' accounts show that the actual purposes of this embassy were to renew friendship with Rome and petition to import corn from Sicily.<sup>50</sup> This fabrication was to justify Roman punishments on Rhodes after 168 BC since the Rhodians had acted in Perseus' interest for some time.

Although fictional, one may conclude from Livy's story that Rhodes had indeed triggered Roman suspicion and anger, and the annalistic narratives were influenced by such hostility; also, one way the Romans could express this anger was to declare the freedom of their allies' subjects.

The primary literary sources are contradictory regarding this matter. Still, the Roman punishment of Rhodes was uncommon. Other Roman allies were also arrogant, proud and morally questionable but were spared in these situations. For example, the

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44 Livy 44.14.8-13; Eckstein 1988, 426-434.

45 Polybius 27.3; Livy 38.37.5-6; Berthold 1987 181-186.

46 Burton 2011, 6-27.

47 Burton 2011, 278-299.

48 Livy 44.14.5-13, 15.1-2.

49 Briscoe 2012, 507-508.

50 Polybius 28.2, 16; Walbank 1979, 328.

Aetolian League abandoned its alliance with Rome, insulted Roman legates and refused the peace offers of the Romans several times, causing the Senate to be furious. However, they still conducted a treaty and alliance as soon as they accepted Roman terms, whilst the Rhodians, displaying only little arrogance in comparison to this, were threatened with total destruction and their requests for an alliance were deferred several years.<sup>51</sup> Their petition to sacrifice and dedicate to Jupiter at Capitoline was also turned down, which is the only known case of the second century BC.<sup>52</sup> There must have been further reasons beyond the Rhodians' ill-timed mediation.

Berthold believes that the Romans had changed their attitude because after the Third Macedonian War, as the undisputed master of the Mediterranean, the Romans no longer needed their former allies. Nevertheless, it is doubtful that such a drastic change in Roman attitudes could have occurred in such a short time.<sup>53</sup> Wiemer suggests that the suspicion and hostility in Rome towards Rhodes was waiting for an opportunity to express itself, and the arrival of the Lycian mission was just such an opportunity.<sup>54</sup>

## THE GALATIAN REVOLT

Rome's latent discontent, suspicion and hostility towards its allies come into a clear view when their dealings with Rhodes are compared with their attitude and acts towards Eumenes in 168-166/5 BC.

A series of successful campaigns against the Galatians enabled the Attalids to establish and consolidate some degree of control over the area before the Third Macedonian War.<sup>55</sup> However, instead of being awarded again as a faithful ally of Rome, a rumour of a secret agreement between Eumenes and Perseus during the war raised anger and hostility towards the king among the Romans.<sup>56</sup> The alienation of the Romans from Eumenes had weakened the latter's influence in Asia Minor, and the Galatians seized the opportunity to rebel against Pergamon.<sup>57</sup>

When the rebellion broke out, Eumenes sent his brother Attalus to Rome to request the Senate's assistance.<sup>58</sup> Attalus received a warm welcome in Rome, but the Senate planned to split the Attalid kingdom and create a separate one for Attalus instead of

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51 Polybius 30.4.2-5.16, 19.17, 21, 23.2-4, 31.19-20; Livy 45.20.4-25.13; Diodorus 31.5.

52 Marsi 2016, 14-15.

53 Berthold 1987, 195-212.

54 Wiemer 2003, 287-288.

55 Rankin 1996, 197-198; Evans 2012, 34-36; Ma 2013, 53-54.

56 Gruen 1984, 563; Errington 1972, 242-248.

57 Polybius 29.22.3-4; *OGIS* 305; Walbank 1979, 395.

58 Polybius 30.1-3.

assisting Eumenes.<sup>59</sup>

There was a less plausible story about Attalus aiming to betray his brother, but finally giving up the idea.<sup>60</sup> In the end, the Senate declared Ainos and Maroneia free and sent Publius Licinius Crassus to Galatia.<sup>61</sup> The peace attempt of the Roman legate failed, and “the words of Roman envoys had had such weight with those prosperous kings Antiochus and Ptolemy that they at once made peace, whereas with the Galatians, Roman words were without effect”.<sup>62</sup>

Despite lacking Roman military support, Eumenes defeated the Galatians at Phrygia in 166/5 BC.<sup>63</sup> In that year, a Galatian mission arrived in Rome, and the Senate responded by granting Galatian autonomy.<sup>64</sup>

### *GRUEN'S INTERPRETATION*

The events around the Galatian revolt have been discussed in depth by E. Gruen. He first argues that modern historians do not hesitate to suggest that the Senate intended to incite war between the Galatians and Eumenes. Still, Polybius apparently had no evidence for the extra instructions given to Licinius and could only guess at the Senate's intention.<sup>65</sup> From Livy's account, there is no basis for such a judgement since the commissioners' purpose was unambiguous.<sup>66</sup>

However, Gruen's view seems problematic. First, the sending of Licinius and the liberation of Ainos and Maroneia were linked. Since the handling of these two cities' affairs was contrary to Attalus' demands, there is no reason to assume that the Senate would meet Attalus' request in the Galatian affair.<sup>67</sup> Secondly, when relations between the two countries had been cordial in the past, the Senate had hardly responded to fulfil Eumenes' request.<sup>68</sup> At a time when Rome was hostile to Pergamon, and Eumenes had to “leave Italy as soon as possible”, it seems unlikely that the Senate would assist Pergamon.<sup>69</sup> Furthermore, the negotiations excluded Attalus. Also, in terms of the outcome, Licinius failed to end this war; on the contrary, the Roman words “were without effect”.

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59 Polybius 30.1.6-8.

60 Polybius 30.2; Hansen 1971, 122.

61 Polybius 30.3.5-7.

62 Livy 45.34.10-14.

63 Diodorus 31.14, 16-17; Evans 2012, 40.

64 Polybius 30.28.

65 Polybius 30.3.8-9; Gruen 1984, 577.

66 Livy 45.34.10.

67 Polybius 30.3.5-7.

68 Errington 1972, 175-178; Hopp 1977, 34-58.

69 Polybius 31.19.8.

All this makes one wonder about the Senate's real intention in sending Licinius to Galatia. The Senate did not necessarily intend to encourage the Galatians to fight Eumenes, but clearly, it did not intend to end this war.

Gruen then advocates that the Senate's declaration of autonomy for Galatia was not intended to undermine the Attalids but rather to restrict the Galatians since they had to remain in their settlements, and it was the Galatians who frustrated Roman peace effects the previous year.<sup>70</sup>

However, it was Eumenes who had entered Galatia and won the war, and the declaration of autonomy favoured the defeated Galatian side. Shortly after the declaration, King Prusias II of Bithynia complained to the Senate that Eumenes by no means stopped meddling with Galatia, which violated the prior decree of the Senate.<sup>71</sup>

There seems to be no reason to think that the Senate would have sent a mission specifically to restrict the behaviour of the Galatians because of the two-sided conflict between Pergamon and Galatia. Gruen also argues that the Senate's arrangement did not hinder Eumenes' expansion into Galatia.<sup>72</sup> Whilst that is true, it does not follow that the Senate did not intend to do so. Moreover, the Romans had historically shown little concern for peace in Asia Minor unless it directly threatened Roman interests in the area.<sup>73</sup> The Senate merely sent a mission of inquiry in response to the turmoil in Asia Minor around 180 BC, when the regional stability established by the Treaty of Apamea fell apart.<sup>74</sup> In 178 BC, the Senate also did not intervene in any way when Rhodes tried to suppress the second revolt of Lycia.<sup>75</sup>

## CONCLUSION

The material suggests a coherent kernel in the Lycian affair of 189-178 BC and the Galatian revolt of 167-166/5 BC: both Lycia and Galatia were spoils of war awarded by Rome to its allies Rhodes and Pergamon; their control over these territories was not secure, however, as Lycians and Galatians rebelled several times. When these revolts were suppressed, and the Lycians and the Galatians sent embassies to Rome, the Romans were notoriously suspicious and even hostile towards Rhodes and Pergamon. Therefore, their missions were looked upon favourably by the Senate, in contrast to the cold reception given to the Rhodian and Pergamene

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<sup>70</sup> Gruen 1984, 577.

<sup>71</sup> Polybius 30.30.2-6.

<sup>72</sup> Gruen 1984, 577-578.

<sup>73</sup> Errington 1972, 181.

<sup>74</sup> Gruen 1984, 553.

<sup>75</sup> Berthold 1987, 167-178; Eckstein 2008, 355.

delegates.

Based on the discussions above, there is reason to assume that this was a diplomatic way for the Romans to sow discord and instability among their allies, ultimately weakening them. The Romans did not provide material or military support for their "freedom" or "autonomy" but merely incentivised the oppressed rebels to rise again.<sup>76</sup> The decisions of the Senate in 178 BC and 166/5 BC were not purely accidental but instead reflected a certain logic in Roman behaviour towards Asia Minor.

The Romans probably had no grand strategy: the liberation of Kaunos and Stratonikeia in 166 BC was perhaps a fortuitous event. If the exiles from the two cities had not travelled to Rome to demand the evacuation of Rhodian garrisons, the Senate would not have noticed them.<sup>77</sup> It also seems unlikely that the Senate would have granted freedom to Ainos and Maroneia if Attalus had not mentioned them in 167 BC.<sup>78</sup> However, the lack of a grand strategy meant something other than Rome being indifferent to affairs in Asia Minor. On the contrary, the Romans were simply waiting for an opportunity to express their hostility and to attack their allies.

Rome was a power that "had always been suspicious of strong neighbours" and whose goodwill disappeared quickly.<sup>79</sup> Their relationship with Rhodes and Pergamon was not always harmonious as Gruen argues, nor were their acts always just and fair, as Burton advocates.<sup>80</sup> With Macedonia disintegrated, the Ptolemies and the Seleucids declined, and Rhodes and Pergamon became the remaining substantial powers in the Eastern Mediterranean, resulting in a rapid loss of Roman favour shortly after the war.

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76 Gruen 1984, 123-124; Rankin 1996, 199.

77 Polybius 30.21.2-3; Berthold 1987, 202.

78 Briscoe argues that the Senate's conspiracy concerning Attalus, the humiliation of Eumenes, and the proclamation of Galatian autonomy were part of a systematic plan to undermine Pergamon; there is no evidence that the Senate secretly planned the Galatian revolt and arranged the events followed. See Briscoe, 1969, 54-56.

79 Errington, 1972, 155.

80 Burton 2011, 278-299; Gruen 1984.

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